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Abstract
Kosovo’s first Pride parade on October 10, 2017 was an important landmark for Kosovo’s
LGBT community. The event was remarkable both as the first event of its kind and in that
it occurred without violence. While the Western Balkans have seen significant progress on
LGBT rights, differences in degree of homophobia are clear across the former Yugoslav
states. Slovenia and Croatia have become the least homophobic in the region while Serbia
and Kosovo are the most. Where other arguments fail to adequately justify this disparity,
EU accession explains the emergent differences in LGBT human rights since the breakup
of Yugoslavia.
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Section 1: Introduction
To most countries, the installation of the state’s first openly gay Prime Minister
would be a moment of great celebration for local LGBT NGOs and activists. When
Serbia’s President Vucić appointed Ana Brnabić to the office, local LGBT NGOs didn’t
so much sing her praises as they rolled their eyes. Despite the fact that Brnabić made
Serbia just the fifth state with an openly LGBT1 head of state, LGBT NGOs responded
with skepticism that Brnabić’s appointment indicated a shift in the perception of the
LGBT community in Serbia. Rather, they viewed the symbolism of her appointment as a
gesture to the international community, most notably the European Union (EU). This
came after a couple years of consistent annual Pride events following several years of
consistently cancelled Pride events by the state under the guise of security concerns. Socalled security concerns are frequently a pretext to bar Pride events in many conservative
Central and Eastern European states. The violence at Serbia’s 2010 Pride served as such
an excuse until the next Pride in 2014. (Fecanji 2017; McLaughlin 2017).
The situation for LGBT persons in Serbia or their southern neighbor Kosovo is
pairs interestingly with that of the other former Yugoslav states of Slovenia and Croatia.
Where LGBT rights have been slow to improve with only a handful of recent changes

1

Here I use LGBT to refer to the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender community. LGBTI meaning
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex is more common both in the Western Balkans and in the
literature on the region. I have deliberately chosen not to use LGBTI because discussing the human rights
of intersex individuals is outside the scope of this project due to both a lack of existing literature and lack
of protections for LGBT individuals both at the state level and at the EU level in these cases. LGBTQ
meaning Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer is more commonly used in the United States as
the inclusion of Queer makes the term more inclusive, however, LGBTQ is not commonly used in the
Western Balkans and there is contestation around the English language-centric nature of the term Queer.
For these reasons I have elected not to use LGBTQ in this project.
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over the last few years in Serbia and Kosovo, Slovenia and Croatia have seen huge
developments in LGBT human rights in the last decade. These states, united in
Yugoslavia for nearly seventy-five years, have moved apart dramatically in their
treatment of LGBT rights since the 1990s. Why have LGBT rights emerged in some
former Yugoslav states where they are slow to develop in others?
Another key area of variation in the former Yugoslav states is Europeanization,
the process of becoming integrated into the European Union and centralizing a
“European” identity. Where some former Yugoslav states have been included in the
Eastern Expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe others remain slow to move towards
EU membership at varying stages of the accession process. Slovenia and Croatia are
currently the only two former Yugoslav states to have completed the accession process
and become EU members, in 2004 and 2013 respectively. Serbia and Kosovo remain
outside the EU but not outside the sphere of its influence. The economic and political
benefits of EU membership are highly desirable and influence the actions of the
governments of these states to do things they otherwise might not to receive these
benefits. At present Serbia is a candidate for EU membership while Kosovo is a potential
membership candidate and has had extensive, if not unique, ties to the EU since the
beginning of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in 2008.
In these cases, there is a correlation between progress towards EU membership
and making improvements on LGBT human rights. Since the early 2000s, LGBT human
rights, falling under the category of fundamental rights, have become increasingly
5

important to the accession process. The ideas of being European and LGBT friendly are
tied for the Eastern Enlargement states in ways they were not in previous enlargements
because of this recent increase. In this paper I argue a causal relationship between EU
accession processes and LGBT human rights. Potential EU membership provides states
with incentives to change their approach to fundamental rights, including LGBT human
rights, in ways they otherwise might not. This relationship tracks when examining the
timelines of EU accession and LGBT rights in each of these cases.
There are other arguments as to the causes of these variations in LGBT rights
across the former Yugoslav states. While the purpose of this paper is specifically to make
the argument of the direct influence of the EU in LGBT rights as the cause of these
variations, I do not believe that I can effectively make this case without addressing some
of these alternative explanations. The literature on homophobia offers multiple causes of
homophobia, including state-level homophobia, which could be applicable in these cases.
In outlining the context for the four cases in this paper in Section 2 I also address some of
these alternative explanations and why I believe, in the context of the former Yugoslav
states, these explanations are not useful.

1.2 Argument
Based on the structure of the EU accession process, Eastern Europe’s lagging
record on LGBT rights, and the incentives for Eastern European states to join the EU, I
argue that in the case of the former Yugoslav states EU accession plays a significant role
in the shifting status of LGBT rights. States which have progressed through EU accession
6

in the 21st century have had the external motivation in the benefits of EU membership
and exposure to norm diffusion processes to change significantly with regard to LGBT
human rights. Whereas, in states who are not EU member candidates or only part way
through the accession process that incentive to counter public and institutional resistance
to LGBT human rights is not as present. In the 1990s and 2000s the EU has instituted
expectations of new member states of the fifth and sixth enlargements, in 2004 and 2013
respectively around LGBT rights that were not in force for states which joined the EU in
the Twentieth century. Slootmaeckers and Touquet (2016) describe this as the coevolution of EU enlargement and fundamental human rights policies on LGBT rights (1921). The influence of both official standards around LGBT rights in the EU and ideals of
Europe as uniquely LGBT-friendly continent is a new phenomenon (2016).
Theories of norm diffusion2 show that a connection between states (or between a
collection of states and an individual state) can facilitate the diffusion of ideas, values,
and norms from the group to the individual state. While an institution, like the EU, can
have very direct, intentional impact on the actions and official opinion of the state and
political actors it cannot, by its nature, have such a direct impact on public opinion.
However, norm diffusion is much more subtle and shaped more by the connection
between the institution and the state than the power of the institution. Because norm
diffusion, in addition to official policy changes, is involved in Europeanization, we
should see Europeanization exhibit changes in the broader society outside the

2

For more on norm diffusion see section 3.2
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government. While norm diffusion, for example, may not change the positions of
organized nationalist groups on LGBT rights, it can normalize the LGBT community and
LGBT rights in the public. It can also connect local LGBT organizations to LGBT
organization in the EU allowing for broader organization and the influence of non-local
LGBT organization in respective new member or candidate states. Due to norm diffusion,
in the EU accession process we can also expect to see local NGOs emboldened and
empowered to pursue change within their state. EU accession can create opportunity and
support, through the incentives for the state and norm diffusion respectively, for NGOs to
push for further legislative progress in LGBT rights.

1.3 Methods
To examine homophobia in each case study I will be using indicators of
homophobia and of LGBT equality to both establish levels of homophobia in each state
and key dates where changes in these indicators occurred. While, for the purposes of this
paper, I broadly define homophobia as state, societal, or personal negative against
persons for their actual or perceived homosexuality, here in my methodology I do
distinguish where I examine state or societal homophobia. The indicators and the dates
combined will establish where changes in LGBT rights have occurred in each of the case
studies and when they occurred. The dating of these changes is key to my argument as it
will establish when changes occurred in relation to changes in each states’ relationship
with the EU. Changes motivated by the accession process and the prospect of becoming
an EU member state will occur in the years immediately prior to reaching candidate
8

status or in the years between attaining candidate status and becoming an EU member.
Because of the key role of timing in this argument in establishing causality between EU
accession and LGBT rights I use timelines to illustrate the way in which timing is key to
the LGBT rights changes in each case, in comparison to changes in EU accession
policies.
Establishing changes in policy indicators of homophobia or LGBT equality is a
fairly simple process. Typically, policy can be traced back to a day of enactment or a
voting day where there is a clear line between “before the policy” and “after the policy.”
When the change happens is distinct in matters of policy. When it comes to measuring
and tracking societal change, however, things become much more complicated. There are
no such distinct lines in examining societal feelings on the LGBT community. The
quality of the most straightforward measure of societal opinion, surveys on questions
around LGBT rights, vary greatly in quality, precise topic, geographic area of study,
sample size, and regularity. Additionally, because there is no single survey which covers
all four of the case in this paper this variation in surveys is an additional challenge.
Public accommodation or societal acceptance can also be examined through other
measures such as rates of hate crimes or rates of experienced discrimination, however,
while higher rates of negative feelings towards LGBT persons leads to greater rates of
hate crimes and other forms of discrimination it also leads to a decrease in reports of hate
crimes and discrimination. Official statistics are therefore highly flawed and are not
reflective of actual experiences of the LGBT community in that state. Statistics reported
9

through surveys conducted by independent organizations can be more reflective of actual
conditions than official statistics, however they can still be influenced by underreporting
and the methodology of the survey in question and the representativeness of the sample
should be considered. Ultimately, any form of societal analysis available to me in this
project will be deeply flawed.
Because policy analysis alone is too limited to adequately examine homophobia, I
will use limited analysis of societal change to further address the influence of the EU on
LGBT rights. By using ratings for each case from the International Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (ILGA) in areas of asylum, equality and nondiscrimination, family, hate crime and hate speech, legal gender recognition and bodily
integrity, and civil society space, I will evaluate present day conditions for the LGBT
community in conjunction with the changes over time for each case. I chose the ILGA
scores because, based on my research, it was the only source which included nonlegislative measures of homophobia which was reliable and consistent for all four cases.

Section 2: The Cases
In order to understand the conditions and circumstances which shape human
rights, politics, and EU relations it is important to understand and consider the political
and geographic background of the cases and the EU’s background in relation to
fundamental rights, including LGBT rights. This section aims to lay out the necessary
background needed to understand the central argument of this paper, regarding what

10

makes the relationship between EU accession and LGBT rights momentum particularly
interesting in the former Yugoslav states.

2.1 LGBT Rights in Yugoslavia
While other Eastern Bloc countries, and their LGBT citizens, were separated from
the growing LGBT movement in “the West,” Yugoslavia’s comparatively open borders
allowed gay and lesbian Yugoslavs to be exposed to and influenced by LGBT
movements in Europe and North America (Kuhar 2014, 136). Despite its openness,
however, Yugoslavia was by no means a gay oasis. As Irene Dioli (2011) states, “within
the country’s dominant culture—not an exception to the repression and domestication of
sexuality shared by communist systems—a rhetorical emphasis of hegemonic masculinity
stigmatized male homosexuality as an expression of weakness, while a general erasure of
female sexuality and pleasure virtually canceled female homosexuality from the picture”
(313). This was demonstrated in Yugoslavia’s penal code, which criminalized male
homosexual anal sex acts,3 but did not include female homosexual sex acts (Dioli 2011,
314). The criminalization of homosexuality in Yugoslavia did not necessarily lead to
widespread legal persecution of LGBT Yugoslavs; it did connect to the stigma and
marginalization of Yugoslavia’s LGBT community. As a result of the disconnect between
the criminalization of homosexuality and persecution, the decriminalization of
homosexuality in some Yugoslav Republics and Vojvodina (an autonomous province

3

Homosexual anal sex acts were criminalized until 1977 in Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, and the Serbian
province Vojvodina and until 1994 in all other former Yugoslav Republics.
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within Serbia) in the late 1970s, did not decrease persecution and discrimination against
the LGBT community in Yugoslavia (Kuhar 2014, 135-136).
The conflicts of the 1990s and the associated rise in nationalism and
traditionalism meant that what limited space and tolerance had been granted to LGBT
Yugoslavs disappeared. Where the LGBT community had gained visibility in the 1980s,
they were then targeted for violence. The city of Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, had
been particularly open to the LGBT community in Yugoslavia and developed visible
LGBT spaces. However, in the early 90s these spaces were targeted by neo-Nazi and
other nationalist groups (Kuhar 2014, 137). The aftermath of the violent disintegration of
Yugoslavia and the economic and social crises of the 1990s triggered a retraditionalization process in the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s. There was a “repatriarchialization” of family values and in the ideals around gender roles. In nationalist
and patriarchal ideals anyone outside the hyper-masculine male or maternal women ran
counter to nationalist ideology around the biological continuation of the nation. While
Yugoslavia had never necessarily been “gay-friendly,” with the growth in nationalism
and traditionalism, homophobia grew in the former Yugoslav states (Dioli 2011, 313315).4

4

For more on the connections between nationalism and homophobia see section 3.1
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2.2 Case Studies
Yugoslavia, literally “the land of Southern Slavs,” in its first iteration, was formed
following post-World War One breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.
In the Second World War, the Croatian Fascist Ustaše, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy
occupied Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito led the Communist Partisans in occupied
Yugoslavia who, in partnership with the royalist Chetniks, liberated Yugoslavia.
Following the Second World War, Yugoslavia, under Tito and the Communist Party’s
leadership, became the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.5 Tito remained
Yugoslavia’s leader until his death in 1980. Following his death, Yugoslavia assumed a
system of collective presidency where a new president assumed the role each year as a
representative of their respective republic. Slobodan Milošević became the President of
the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986 and became President the Socialist Republic
of Serbia in 1989.6 In 1991 Milošević blocked the election of the Croatian President to
the collective presidency and Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence just a few
months later triggering the breakup of Yugoslavia. While Slovenia and Serbia’s conflict
lasted for 10 days, aptly named “the Ten Days War,” Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia’s
bloody conflict would continue until the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. As
the republics declared their independence Yugoslavia shrank into “Rump Yugoslavia,”
consisting of Montenegro and Serbia, including Serbia’s two autonomous provinces
Vojvodina and Kosovo.

5
6

Changed to Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963
The Socialist Republic of Serbia became the Republic of Serbia in 1991.
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Tensions in Kosovo, already on the rise since Tito’s death, grew under
Milošević’s repressive leadership. The situation escalated in the early to mid-1990s as
Milošević first segregated the education of Serb and Albanian students in Kosovo and
eventually barred all Albanian students and teachers from all levels of education.
Milošević also fired nearly all ethnic Albanians in government employment causing
widespread unemployment among Kosovar Albanians. Violence escalated and the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed. Eventually the violence and ethniccleansing of Kosovar Albanians escalated to the point where the international community
feared the war in Kosovo would resemble the violence and ethnic-cleansing of Bosnia.
NATO intervened with a months-long bombing campaign in 1999 which eventually
ended the conflict. Kosovo received assistance through the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) until 2008 and by NATO through the peacekeeping Kosovo Force
(KFOR) mission. In 2008 Kosovo officially declared their independence from Serbia and
later that year the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) began.
Of the four cases included in this paper, Slovenia sits as both the northernmost
and the wealthiest; Kosovo is the southernmost and poorest. In September 2018 Slovenia
had an unemployment rate of 7.8 percent, while Kosovo had an unemployment rate of
30.7 percent (“Slovenia Unemployment Rate” 2019; “Kosovo - Economic Indicators”
2019). There are also significant linguistic and religious differences across the four cases.
Slovenia predominantly speaks Slovenian and Kosovar Albanians speak Albanian.
Beyond the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in Serbian, there are no significant differences
14

between Serbian and Croatian languages (once referred to as Serbo-Croatian, the official
language of Yugoslavia). Slovenia and Croatia are predominantly Catholic, Serbia is
predominantly Serbian Orthodox, and Kosovar Albanians are predominantly Muslim
with a Catholic minority.
Slovenia was the first of the former Yugoslav states to become an EU member in
2004. Croatia joined them as a member in 2013. Serbia is currently a candidate for EU
membership and has been since 2012. Kosovo’s situation is more unique. While not a
candidate for EU membership, Kosovo became a potential candidate for EU membership
after they signed onto the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the agreement
went into force in 2016.
The four cases in this project demonstrate four different situations for LGBT
rights which are perhaps best illustrated through examples of how each state’s unique
context plays out with regards to LGBT rights. In 2016, the blog Two Bad Tourists
published an article titled “Why Gay Travelers Should Start Heading to Slovenia.” The
article posed two central arguments: one, that Slovenia was an underappreciated tourism
destination with beautiful natural wonders, easy day trips, and excellent food and wine;
the second, that Slovenia “is proving itself to be a country of the times” and becoming
more and more “gay-friendly” by the day (“Why Gay Travelers…” 2016). Slovenia is the
only of the former Yugoslav states to recognize same-sex marriage following a
parliamentary vote in 2016 which introduced same-sex marriage without rights to
adoption or in-vitro fertilization for same-sex couples. This was after the Slovenian
15

public rejected same-sex marriage (without restrictions) in a 2015 referendum on the
issue.
In a December 2013 referendum supported by the Catholic Church, Croatia voted
65% in favor of defining marriage as between one man and one woman. Less than one
year later, in 2014 Croatia’s parliament passed the “Croatia’s Life Partnership Act”
which granted same-sex couples many of the rights granted in, except the rights to joint
adoption and in-vitro fertilization. Croatia’s LGBT community still faces marginalization
in other areas. In 2017, teargas was thrown into an LGBT nightclub in Zagreb and, in
2018, a copy of the, then newly released, Croatian picture book “My Rainbow Family”
was burned at a pre-Lent event (Vladisavljevic 2018). Still, for the region Croatia has
made a lot of progress around LGBT rights since their independence. Over the course of
Croatia’s EU accession process, they didn’t just meet the requirements around LGBT
rights, they actually exceeded them (Slootmaeckers et al. 2016, 29).
In contrast to Slovenia and Croatia Serbia has no form of same-sex partnership
recognition. Until recently, Serbia’s government regularly canceled Pride events on the
grounds of safety and security, a strategy used throughout Eastern Europe to provide an
illusion of supporting Pride events by allowing them to be planned without allowing them
to take place. However, safety is indeed a concern for the LGBT community in Serbia
around public events. Belgrade’s 2010 Pride Parade, which was allowed to take place,
was met with violence against participants and police.

16

Serbia is the only of the former Yugoslav states to have an openly gay leader. Ana
Brnabić was appointed to the position of Prime Minister by President Vučić in 2017
making her both the first female and first openly gay person individual to hold that office.
An openly gay leader is a rarity not only in the Balkans but globally as well. In February
2019, Brnabić’s partner gave birth to their first child despite restrictions on same-sex
adoption. Second parent adoption is not an option for same-sex couples in Serbia and
same-sex couples must seek artificial insemination abroad as Serbia has no options for
the donation of reproductive material. Prime Minister Brnabić, despite her symbolic
firsts, is not considered a spokesperson by the LGBT community. She has rarely spoken
out about LGBT rights in Serbia and once stated that she did not believe Serbia is a
homophobic country (Zivanovic 2019).
As Kosovo began to build its independence with assistance from the international
community in the early 2000s, Kosovo introduced rights and legislation that theoretically
protected LGBT Kosovars. The Law on Discrimination, passed in 2004, barred
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, leaders of LGBT organization
have stated that the MPs voting on these decisions understood neither the legislation they
were voting for nor LGBT rights (Morina 2016). It is because of situations like this that
Kosovo uniquely lacks clarity on the issue of same-sex marriage. LGBT activists argue
that Kosovo’s Constitution permits same-sex marriage; Article 37 of Kosovo’s
Constitution grants the right of marriage to all. However, Article 14 of the Constitution,
the Law on Family, specifies that marriage is between those of different sexes.
17

Additionally, no same-sex marriage has ever been legally recognized in Kosovo and there
have been no legal challenges (Morina 2017). Not all is bleak for LGBT rights in
Kosovo. Kosovo had its first Pride events in October 2017, successfully followed by their
second Pride in October 2018.

2.3 LGBT Rights and the European Union
In recent years fundamental values have become increasingly important to the
EU’s narrative. The idea of the European Union as a defender of certain fundamental
rights, or basic rights inherently owed to all persons, has grown in importance internally
as well as in its foreign and enlargement policies. As the EU looked to expand to the
former communist states of Eastern Europe following the fall of the Iron Curtain Europe
had to consider its approach to enlargement concerning human rights in those states. The
foundational documents of the EU gave it a platform, beginning in the 2000s, to herald
the rising importance of fundamental rights. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union,
as amended by later treaties, states,
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance,
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (European
Council 2007).
Article 49 goes on to require that all new Member States adhere to these tenants
(European Council 2007). These articles are the central places where ideas of equality
and tolerance as necessary for EU membership are expanded upon in other areas of EU
18

law. As the notion of fundamental rights has grown in importance the accession process
has changed to bring these rights and the development of these rights into the fold. In
1993 the Copenhagen European Council summit issued the Copenhagen criteria which
firmly established a set of criteria for EU accession which included criteria that the states
must guarantee human rights and must accept established EU law and practices
(Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016, 24; “Conditions for Membership” 2016).
What is significant to this thesis is that this increase in prominence of
fundamental rights has coincided with the increasing attention to LGBT human rights in
Europe. As Slootmaeckers and Touquet (2016) point out, “being ‘gay-friendly’ has now
become a symbol for what it means to be European and vice versa. And with this
evolution an important mechanism for transforming candidate member states into
countries ready (and worthy) to become a member of the EU and take up the
responsibilities of such membership, including respect for LGBT rights” (20).
While the criteria make no mention of the LGBT community, the Copenhagen
criteria, by introducing mandate on EU law, indirectly mandated the decriminalization of
homosexual sex acts and the equalization of ages of consent, so that ages of consent for
homosexual and heterosexual sex acts are the same, in new member states. The
Copenhagen criteria also moved the accession process and the compliance with accession
requirements from a categorical approach, with states that were either complying or not,
to a negotiation-based process where requirements for accession and a state’s compliance
was monitored and evaluated regularly (Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016, 24). While
19

LGBT rights were not a central tenet of the Copenhagen criteria, the Copenhagen criteria
were the first among many steps in introducing LGBT rights as a requirement for EU
accession.
In November 2000, the European Council published Council Directive
2000/78/EC, which prohibited “any direct or indirect discrimination based on religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” in employment. It was the first document or
declaration in the EU explicitly banning discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation and, as a result of the directive and the Copenhagen criteria, candidate states
were now mandated to adopt legislation protecting Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual (LGB)
persons from discrimination in employment (European Council 2000; Slootmaeckers and
Touquet 2016, 24).
Fundamental rights, as they were growing in importance in the early 2000s,
became an official and key piece of pre-accession negotiations in 2005, when the
European Commission amended enlargement policies by introducing Chapter 23, a
chapter on the judiciary and fundamental rights, to the acquis. Chapter 23 moved
fundamental rights from a precondition to begin accession negotiations to a central piece
of those negotiations to be monitored throughout the accession process (Slootmaeckers
and Touquet 2016, 25).

20

2.4 Alternative Explanation: Religion
As I make the case that EU accession explains the variations in LGBT human
rights in the former Yugoslav states, I see it as vital to address other factors which can
influence the prevalence or scarcity of homophobia in a given state or society. There are
several alternative explanations surrounding the causes and explanations of homophobia
that I believe are relevant but fail to explain the variations in homophobia across the four
cases in this project. In the remainder of this section I lay out three primary alternative
explanations for these variations: religion, nationalism, and global changes and explain
why I believe they do not adequately explain the changes in homophobia across the
former Yugoslav states. Examples from across the four cases provide further evidence as
to the inadequacy of these explanations.
In the world at large, but in Central and Eastern Europe specifically, religion and
religious adherence are often used to explain higher levels of homophobia and resistance
to LGBT rights. Scholars emphasize the link between religion and homophobia through
conservatism. There is a high correlation between religiosity and conservatism and
between conservatism and homophobia. The values promoted through religiosity are
shared in conservatism and a piece of these values can often be restrictive views on
gender and sex. In this way religion and homophobia are often tied to each other. (Mole
2016, 109). In some states this proves to be an adequate primary explanation for
homophobia but in the former Yugoslav state religion and religiosity does not explain
variation in homophobia.
21

Variations in religiosity do not align with variations in homophobia across the
region. The case of Kosovo is a particularly strong illustration of how the religiosityhomophobia correlation does not align. While Kosovo is considered the most
homophobic of the former Yugoslav states, it is relatively secular. Even after the end of
Yugoslavia, it has remained difficult to obtain reliable data on religion in Kosovo; based
on approximations of the Albanian population in Albania scholars have made estimates
for the Albanian population in Kosovo. Somewhere between 67 and 75 percent of
Kosovo Albanians are Muslim or from a Muslim background. The remaining 25 to 33
percent are Catholic or Orthodox or from a Catholic or Orthodox background (Judah
2008, 7-8). Views on religion in Kosovo are, as a trend, more relaxed than in other
Balkan states. Religion in Kosovo has largely resisted conservatism; following the
collapse of communism there were attempts at proselytizing more conservative forms of
Islam in Kosovo which largely failed. Islam is not as central to the Kosovar Albanian
identity in the same way, for example, the Serbian Orthodox Church is to the Serb
identity.
Croatia, where Catholicism is tied to the nation, provides a useful comparison to
Kosovo. The importance of the Catholic Church to the idea of the nation and to society is
used to further justify, along with the nationalist arguments around reproduction and
threats to the nation described in Section 3. The Catholic Church in Croatia, as an
important identifier of the Croat nation, is closely linked to the Croatian Far-Right (as the
Serbian Orthodox Church is linked to the nationalist Far-Right in Serbia) (Jovanović
22

2018, 82-83). As Jovanović argues, using evidence from the nationalist and homophobic
Croatian website Narod, homophobia perpetuated by Croatians on Narod is tied to
ideology of the Catholic Church and the idea of the Croat nation’s ties to the Catholic
Church. Homophobia is also often perpetuated at important national religious events. For
example, the burning of “my rainbow family” picture book at a popular pre-Lent event
(Vladisavljevic 2018). While Croatia does possess homophobic legislation and has an
anti-LGBT far-right, Croatia is among the least homophobic, with Slovenia, of the former
Yugoslav states. With homophobia’s ties to Catholicism in Croatia and the importance of
religion in Croatia, as compared to more secular states in the region such as Kosovo, a
lack of or lower degree of religiosity in Croatia cannot be used to explain its lesser degree
of homophobia.
These ties between homophobia, religion, and nationalism connected to religion
are also evident in Slovenia and Serbia. In Serbia local LGBT activists maintain that the
connection between the Serbian Orthodox church and homophobic rhetoric and beliefs is
very strong. The roots of anti-LGBT sentiment in the church reinforces the legitimacy of
homophobic speech and violence (Milosevic 2011). The same is true in Slovenia where
the Catholic Church, as an institution, has taken strong stands against homosexuality and
legislation to improve LGBT human rights including same-sex marriage. Church leaders
in Slovenia have made public statements that the Catholic Church cannot accept
homosexuality and that LGBT persons must “purify” themselves (“The Social Situation
Concerning Homophobia…” 2009, 8)
23

This difference in connection to religion in Kosovo and the unusual amount of
religious diversity among Kosovo Albanians, as compared to their Balkan peers, can be
traced back to the lack of ties between the Albanian identity and religion. Whereas Serb
identity is clearly associated with the Serbian Orthodox Church and Croat identity and
Slovene identity are clearly associated with the Catholic Church, the same is not true for
Albanians. National identity and nationalism have ties to religion throughout the Balkans,
with Kosovar Albanians as an exception. As 19th century poet Pashko Vasa wrote, “the
religion of Albanians is Albanianism” (Judah 2008, 8-9). Because of Kosovo
Albanianism’s relatively loose ties to religion, Kosovo’s high degree of homophobia
cannot be traced to high levels of religiosity. Religion does not serve here as an adequate
explanation of Kosovo’s high levels of homophobia.
In some cases, religion can be a useful explanation for homophobia to social
scientists. However, in my opinion, the cases of the former Yugoslav states cannot be
adequately explained with religion or religiosity. Even if homophobia in some states may
be linked to religion, religion fails to explain the variation between the states. As related
to the diffusion of LGBT norms globally Ayoub states, “the LGBT norm has permeated
different domestic contexts at different rates. For example, some traditionally Catholic
countries blaze new trails on LGBT rights, while some modern, wealthy democracies
remain laggards” (2016, 10). Therefore, while many states do see the prominent role of
religion in their own homophobia, the fact that religion is not a central explanation of
homophobia in the former Yugoslav state does not necessarily make them unusual.
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2.5 Alternative Explanation: Nationalism and EU Accession
An additional alternative explanation for the variations in homophobia observed
in the former Yugoslav states is Nationalism. It could be that EU member states are less
homophobic, not because of the influence of the European Union, but because states with
lesser rates of nationalism, which as a trend will be less homophobic, will be more likely
to reach EU accession than states which are more nationalist. However, I argue that
prevalence of nationalism among states within the European Union, including Slovenia
and Croatia, demonstrates that this is not an adequate explanation of variations in
homophobia in the former Yugoslav states.
Slovenia provides a useful case to demonstrate the ability of states with large
nationalist constituencies, which result in the enactment of nationalist policies or policies
supported by nationalist, to become EU member states. Slovenia joined the EU in May of
2004; in April of 2004 Slovenia passed legislation, via referendum, which denied rights
of residency to those from the other former Yugoslav states. The campaign for the
referendum was led by the far-right opposition, and, while the debate around the
referendum did include some discussion around financial implications, the debate
centered on the questionable loyalty to Slovenia of persons from other former Yugoslav
states (Lungescu 2004). At the time of the referendum Slovenia was set to join the EU the
following month, demonstrating that states with powerful and vocal nationalist
constituencies can still become EU member states.
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EU member states are not immune from nationalism and EU integration does not
inherently counter nationalist projects or sentiments within candidate states. States with
strong nationalist constituencies have and continue to successfully become EU member
states. While Europeanization and nationalism cannot be isolated from each other,
nationalism does not prevent states from becoming EU members (Csergo and Goldgeier
2004). This is evident in the example of Slovenia above. While there are factors that
connect nationalism and homophobia, the fact remains that there is little connection
between nationalism and EU membership. Nationalism cannot explain the correlation
between EU membership and homophobia in the former Yugoslav states.
While nationalism is a contributing factor and indicator of homophobia, as argued
in section 3, the norm diffusion of the accession process directly targets LGBT norms and
incentives provided by the prospect of EU accession allows states to justify official (if
symbolic) moves toward LGBT rights while justifying their actions to nationalist
constituencies. EU accession, while possessing standards on LGBT rights, does not
possess limitations on the existence of nationalist political groups (although the
legislation they promote may violate accession conditions). Therefore, I observe that
nationalism, while it can be linked to homophobia, does not serve as an adequate
explanation for the variations in homophobia in the Balkans.

2.6 Alternative Explanation: Global Trends
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s there have been significant global shifts with
regards to LGBT rights. Even states with some of the most severe laws have moved
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towards decriminalization in this period. Therefore, we might expect that changes with
regards to LGBT rights would be as a consequence of broader global trends with regards
to LGBT rights, particularly as they moved away from the Yugoslav period and
communism towards democratization. Despite what one might expect, evidence shows
that these trends do not necessarily universally apply, particularly in Central and Eastern
Europe.
A Pew Research survey found there is a great deal of divide between Western
Europe and Central and Eastern Europe with regards to LGBT rights. Where most
individuals in Western Europe support same-sex marriage, most individuals in Central
and Eastern Europe oppose same-sex marriage. There is very little state level variation
when it comes to this trend. The only Central and Eastern European country they
surveyed where a majority supported same-sex marriage was the Czech Republic. There
were no Western European countries in their survey where a majority opposed same-sex
marriage (“Eastern and Western Europeans Differ…” 2018).
A variation in support for same-sex marriage does not necessarily prove that
global shifts have not spread to Central and Eastern Europe. With just the information I
included above, there remains the possibility that rather than being outside these trends
Central and Eastern Europe following these trends but simply lag behind Western
Europe. This leaves open the possibility of future change in LGBT rights across Central
and Eastern Europe. If the trends of change are influential in Central and Eastern Europe
with the region simply lagging behind Western Europe there should be generational
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changes evident in the population. If these changes are occurring young people should
show significantly more LGBT friendly views than older generations. What Pew found,
however, was there is little different between young adults and older adults in Central and
Eastern Europe with regards to same-sex marriage. Because of the lack of generational
different Pew specifies that they anticipate little change in the immediate future as
younger generations grow older. This doesn’t necessarily mean that Central and Eastern
Europe is totally separated from global shifts with regards to LGBT rights, but it does
mean that changes in Central and Eastern Europe are not as a result of global shifts as
polling indicates a resistance to global shifts (“Western and Eastern Europeans Differ…”
2018). Central and Eastern Europe is not immune from global changes, particularly those
propagated by social media and increased global connectivity. While these findings do
not indicate future changes, at least in the immediate future, there remains the possibility
that as the substance and means of these global shifts on LGBT rights changes the
receptivity of Central and Eastern Europe to global shifts may also change.

Section 3: The Literature
The central argument of this paper is that the process of Europeanization
encourages states to make progress on LGBT rights where they otherwise would not. The
literature comes at this idea from a number of angles including the relationship between
nationalism in the Balkans and homophobia, and how that connects to perceptions of the
EU both with and without aspirations of EU membership, how Europeanization impacts
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norm diffusion, and how Europeanization decreases political risks of supporting LGBT
rights to states.

3.1 Nationalism and Homophobia
Scholars resoundingly find a connection between nationalism and homophobia.
This is notable because of the remarkably high levels of both nationalism and
homophobia in many Central and Eastern European states including the Balkans. In an
article on homophobia in Latvia, Richard Mole (2011) argues Latvia has uniquely high
levels of homophobia because in Latvia homosexuality “is seen as a threat to the
continued existence of the nation” (541). In nations which define themselves in terms of
ethnicity, reproduction becomes increasingly important to the national narrative. These
states are more likely to ascribe to patriarchal family values with strict gender roles
(2011, 548). As Mole describes in his chapter of The EU Enlargement and Gay Politics:
The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice,
The ethnic continuity of the nation is maintained by means of the patriarchal
family, underpinned by heteronormative and patriarchal conceptions of
masculinity and femininity. The most important role that women can play in the
nation is that of the mother, producing sons (and daughters) for the nation and
inculcating in them the ethnic language and culture, while men act as defenders
and decision makers (2016, 105).
This is a structure in which homosexuality defies nationalist standards for gendered
behavior and, therefore, represents a threat to the nation. Because of the framing of the
nation and homosexuality as mutually exclusive, nationalism is tied directly to
homophobia (Mole 2011; Mole 2016, 105). Building off of Mole’s arguments that to
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nationalists homosexuality presents a threat to the continuity of the nation. Gould and
Moe (2015) outline the connection between homophobia, nationalism, and the
international community from the 1990s to 2008 in Serbia.
In the early 1990s as the Yugoslav wars began Milošević’s regime promoted
patriarchal gender norms of individuals relationship to the nation as part of the regime’s
nationalist rhetoric. As Gould and Moe describe, “the regime championed a patriarchal,
ethno-sexual frontier in which Serbian men were expected to protect a nation under siege
from hostile ethnic enemies that were–at least initially–largely of the regime’s own
invention” (2015, 276). Because, under threat from perceived fertile national enemies,
nationalism in Balkan states placed an emphasis on procreation (Mole 2016). This placed
homosexuality outside what Gould and Moe describe as the “ethno-sexual frontier,” it
was useful to the regime to link the international community with homosexuality.
Homophobia in this case was a rhetorical resource for the regime. Because they were able
to connect NGOs, foreign embassies, aid organizations, and political opponents to
homosexuality, the regime was able to also portray these groups as similarly counter the
nation (Gould and Moe 2015, 278).
The established link between internationals and sexual minorities, placing the
international community including the ICTY and the EU beyond the “ethno-sexual
frontier,” tied their fates. Following 2005, Serbia began to develop further interest in
completing the accession process, which it had already began a few years earlier without
much action towards meeting EU standards for accession. The new government,
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following the fall of Milošević, was at least symbolically invested to reforming human
rights for the LGBT community. However, this shift in government and investment in
becoming an EU member state marked a change in allegiances somewhat away from
nationalist interests and institutions (Gould and Moe 2015). In 2009, when a bishop in the
Serbian Orthodox Church, an institution which routinely promotes Serb nationalist
values, successfully removed protections for LGBT persons from anti-discrimination
legislation just hours before it was scheduled to be voted upon in Serbia’s parliament.
However, activists were able to secure a delay for the vote. International and domestic
activists and organizations embarked on a lobbying campaign which successful returned
LGBT protections to the legislation before it passed its parliamentary vote (2015, 279281). Though nationalist rhetoric undermined international institutions, as EU accession
became increasingly appealing and human rights for sexual minorities became a standard
for EU accession, this connection began to serve Serbia’s LGBT community.

3.2 Norm Diffusion and the EU Accession Process
Norm diffusion is the adoption, by a state, of standards of a community. Norms
spread from states where they are accepted to states where they are not. States are
influenced by outside actors or states to adopt new norms which they would not without
such influence (Ayoub 2017, 6-7). Norm diffusion can manifest through action, such as
government policies; lack of negative action, such as a lack of retaliation to events which
would have elicited retaliation in the past; or negative attention due to increased
awareness overall, such as counter protests on an issue that received little to no attention
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in the past (Swimelar 2017, 915). Ayoub (2016) describes Latvia’s first pride in 2005 in
Riga as an example of this last phenomenon. Scholars studying norm diffusion and
Europeanization have argued that through the accession process norms diffuse into
“formal and informal rules during the creation of shared beliefs through a combination of
rational external incentives, social learning, and identity shifts” (Ayoub 2016, 7;
Swimelar 2017, 915).
Ayoub (2016) argues that Europeanization serves norm diffusion of LGBT rights
through its contributions to visibility norms. In a country without norms around LGBT
acceptance it can be a difficult and dangerous proposal for a LGBT individual to be “out”
in that community, so these individuals are invisible. However, research shows that
having exposure to LGBT individuals makes a person much more likely to accept the
LGBT community generally. Invisibility can keep an individual safe as an individual,
however it suppresses domestic movements This is the reason LGBT groups and activists
have advocated for coming-out as a mechanism for furthering visibility and LGBT
norms. Transnational actors, without the risks which might hold an individual back from
acting, can be an external source of visibility which can normalize LGBT identities and
individuals. Transnational visibility can also create connections between LGBT
movements across borders creating a solidarity which can strengthen LGBT movements
within states without well-established norms for LGBT rights (23-31).
Ayoub also argues that Europeanization facilitates the diffusion of LGBT norms
through a few processes. First, the EU imposes requirements and expectations around
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LGBT rights on member states, which increases the opportunity for local organizations to
influence domestic government institutions. Second, Europeanization creates an
environment which grows networks of transnational activism which exposes actors in
new member states to actors in other member states. Finally, there is so much
mobilization around LGBT rights among existing member states that “EU-level frames
and elites” and their mechanisms of socialization go along with this mobilization (2016,
54-86). In essence, Europeanization creates opportunity for domestic actors on LGBT
rights to both influence local institutions and to connect with actors outside the state. It
creates mechanisms for both the connection of higher-level institutions for norm
diffusion and the development opportunities for local level organizations and activists to
facilitate this norm diffusion.
Swimelar (2017) compares the norm diffusion processes in Bosnia and Serbia to
examine the relationship between the Europeanization process and the diffusion of norms
around LGBT rights. She argues that Serbia, which has EU candidate status and is
becoming increasingly focused on EU membership, has seen more norm diffusion since
the 1990s because of its faster paced Europeanization process than Bosnia, which does
not have candidate status and is not experiencing Europeanization in the same way. In
Serbia this norm diffusion is visible through the granting of permits to Pride Parades, the
passage of anti-discrimination and other pro-LGBT legislation, and the creation of
government programs for the LGBT community (2017). The process of Europeanization
creates external incentives for this norm diffusion in the form of the economic, social,
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and political benefits Serbia would receive as an EU member state to bring about that
norm diffusion. Being in the process of becoming an EU member allows norms of LGBT
rights to better spread from the EU to the candidate state than if the state in question was
at an earlier in the process (2017). Swimlear establishes a link between the process of
Europeanization, including the degree of Europeanization, and diffusion of norms on
LGBT rights.
Beyond norm diffusion, Europeanization expands LGBT through the balancing of
accession requirements and the incentives of EU membership. Europeanization can be an
opportunity for states to expand the human rights of sexual minorities while appeasing
nationalist constituencies with the benefits of EU membership (Slootmaecker et al. 2016,
3; Mikuš 2011, 841-842). Mikuš (2011) argues that Serbia’s government was able to
permit the 2010 Belgrade Pride and form a sort of political alliance with the organizers,
framed by the context of Europeanization which then both served to create public space
for Serbia’s LGBT community and further reinforced nationalist perceptions of LGBT
human rights as foreign. This is strategic both for the state and for the parade organizers.
By intentionally using Serbia’s status as a candidate for EU membership to promote the
parade to the state, organizers were able to secure permissions for the parade which had
previously not been permitted due to government concerns around security (2011, 841842). At the same time, the state was able to endorse the parade and therefore support
LGBT norms, at least rhetorically, without facing political repercussions from nationalist
constituencies. Serbia’s government successfully used the connection between LGBT
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norms and the international community, including the EU, to justify the parade as a part
of the EU accession process.
While the EU may still be outside the nation and sexual minorities a threat to the
nation, the economic, social, and political benefits of EU membership are enough to
justify state action to a nationalist base without facing significant political repercussions,
as would have been the case in the early 2000s just after the fall of the Milošević regime
(2011). Thus, without necessarily altering nationalist ideas of sexual minorities and the
international community, the state is still able to move toward EU accession and its
benefits and expand LGBT rights, at least symbolically.

Section 4: Evidence and Argument
The center of my argument is that when comparing the progress of these four
former Yugoslav states to both the changes in enlargement policies as related to LGBT
human rights and to each other in their individual timelines of EU accession there is a
clear connection between EU accession and new, otherwise unexplained, progress on
LGBT rights. The case of Croatia particularly demonstrates progress through the
accession process; the case of Slovenia demonstrates progress as an EU member, having
become an EU member state just as these new policies were being introduced. Serbia and
Kosovo, at different places in the accession process, demonstrate the ongoing influence
of these policies mid-accession process.

35

Slovenia’s case is slightly unique as compared to the other three cases. Slovenia
became an EU member as the EU introduced new standards around LGBT human rights
meaning that these new standards had little direct impact on Slovenia’s accession
process. What is interesting about Slovenia’s case is examining the changes in LGBT
human rights, comparable to Croatia’s changes before accession, which occurred after
Slovenia became and EU member. Because of Slovenia’s unique timeline it is included
following the other three cases in this section.

4.1 Croatia
Croatia serves as an ultimate example of the shifts in approach to LGBT rights by
governments following the introduction the incentive of EU membership. Because of the
timing of Croatia’s EU accession such that Croatia’s accession process came just
following the growth of fundamental rights in the accession negotiations, Croatia
illustrates the possible progression for LGBT rights over the full course of the accession
process from beginning to end. Croatia joined discussions of the EU’s eastern expansion
just as LGBT rights were emerging into the forefront of enlargement discussions and
their accession process and requirements were the first to include Chapter 23. Despite
setbacks in the accession negotiations due to issues around Croatia’s compliance with the
ICTY tribunal, which included a temporary closure of negotiations around Chapter 23, by
Croatia became an EU member in 2013 it had exceeded the requirements on LGBT
human rights (Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016, 29). As Slootmaeckers and Touquet
(2016) state, “After the opening of Chapter 23 in the EU negotiations (2009), LGBT
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rights became a prominent political topic, and it was no longer possible for those in
power to ignore the rights of the LGBT community, as these issues became part of the
public debate” (29). Croatia’s entry into the EU accession process coincided with the
growth of LGBT human rights in the accession process.
Croatia was the first state of the four cases to see LGBT rights become a
prominent issue as a direct result of the promotion of LGBT rights by the EU in the
accession process. This makes it the key case for examining new policies in the EU’s
eastern enlargement. Figure 1 below offers a comparison of the development of LGBT
rights as an important EU membership requirement and some of Croatia’s most
significant legislative changes around LGBT rights. By observing the changes in EU
accession expectations and policies in the lead up and early years of accession
negotiations with Croatia we can see their impact in the changes introduced in Croatia in
the lead up to 2013.
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Figure 1: Croatia Timeline

What is clear is that while some discussions around LGBT rights and some
progress around those rights had occurred prior to accession negotiations, once Croatia
became a candidate state in 2004 and Chapter 23 was introduced in 2005 LGBT rights
became a new priority. This gave LGBT and human rights NGOs power in policy making
decisions and gave the government an incentive to improve LGBT human rights in a
scenario where neglecting LGBT rights was no longer politically feasible (Slootmaeckers
and Touquet 2016, 28-31). Shifts toward greater protections of LGBT human rights
become increasingly frequent and more regular in the years following Croatia’s move to
candidate status and leading up to Croatia’s membership in 2013.
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One important piece to understand when examining the timeline of changes for
Croatia not only increases in changes once Croatia was persuing EU membership but also
the types of changes they were making. Equalizing ages of consent or permitting Pride
events are changes which are focused more on decriminalization of the LGBT
community, whereas non-discrimination protections and the recognition of hate crimes
based on sexual orientation are centered more on protection and inclusion of the LGBT
community in wider society. The difference between these two types of changes is subtle,
but it indicates a shift not just in the pace of change in accession process but also in the
type of changes.
There are several instances where a shift in the pace of pro-LGBT legislation is
particularly evident, as noted in figure 1 above. After Croatia became an EU candidate
and began to face requirements around fundamental rights, which newly prioritized
LGBT rights, Croatia made notable shifts in its policies. Two years after becoming a
candidate, in 2006 Croatia began to recognize hate crimes based on sexual orientation
and in 2008 Croatia introduced legal protections against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. Croatia also recognizes same-sex couples but does not recognize
same-sex marriage. This is a notable difference between Croatia and Slovenia, who has
recognized same-sex marriage since 2017. However, neither state permits same-sex
couples’ joint adoption or in vitro fertilization rights (see 4.4 for more on Slovenia).
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4.2 Serbia
Serbia, situated partway through the accession process, serves as a clear
comparison point to Croatia. In 2019 Serbia is at a place where the incentives and desired
endpoint are clear, and the first changes are being made with the explicit purpose of
achieving the goal of EU membership. Serbia became an EU candidate in 2012 as the
Eastern Enlargement was in full swing. By that time Chapter 23 LGBT rights were
already established as a priority in accession negotiations. Where Croatia may be
considered a test case for how fundamental rights might shape the relationship between
EU accession and LGBT this is not case for Serbia. Still among the first states dealing
with the inclusion of LGBT rights in accession, Croatia and other EU member states
which were part of the earlier Eastern Enlargement have demonstrated how this change
can shape the accession process from beginning to end. Today, Serbia is in the midst of
its accession process and has far to go in the area of fundamental rights as well as in
corruption, normalization of relations with Kosovo, and the economy (“Serbia 2018
Report” 2018, 2-5).
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Figure 2: Serbia Timeline

From the course of events before and after the EU granted Serbia candidate status,
we can observe important changes to LGBT rights in the state. One trend which is
particularly notable is the changes in policy related to Pride events in Serbia’s capital.
While Serbia had its first Pride march in 2001 Serbia did not have another Pride until
2010. Unfortunately, the 2010 event was marred by violence. Anti-LGBT protesters
violently clashed with police, causing both extensive injury to both police and members
of the public. Serbia had forced the cancellation of Pride events in 2009 and continued to
cancel all Pride events after 2010, under the excuse of public safety, until 2014. The
cancellations mark Serbia as a state reluctant to tackle LGBT rights. Rather take
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measures to prevent violence, governments avoid public debate and succumb to political
push-back from the far-right by not permitting the events under false pretenses. However,
once Serbia was an EU candidate and facing requirements to progress on LGBT rights,
there was a new incentive to allow Pride events to take place in Belgrade. Rather than
avoid approaching LGBT rights politically and in public Serbia’s government had a
greater incentive to, at least, make a show of new tolerance for LGBT rights and to open
up public and political space for LGBT civil society at, perhaps, the expense of appeasing
the far right. If Serbia wanted to continue to pursue EU membership, they had to make
changes in their approach to Pride. Despite the government’s denials that the
cancellations were a “capitulation to the hooligans,” the EU repeatedly condemned the
cancellations (Vasovic 2013). There was no realistic scenario where Serbia could
continue to cancel Pride and become an EU member, therefore, the prospect of EU
accession motivated Serbia in 2014 to alter their approach to Pride.
These changes can also be tracked in the changing statements of the government
in the EU accession process. President Vucić, in the early 2000s Serbian anger at the role
of the international community in the Kosovo War, co-edited a book titled English Gay
Fart Tony Blair (“The Changeling” 2016). Using homophobic rhetoric was common in
Serbia during that period to discredit the international community. Now, Vucić attends
Belgrade’s annual Pride March and promotes LGBT as necessary for Europeanization.
Observers have noted just how much of the current government's actions around LGBT
rights are motivated by a desire to appear LGBT-friendly to the EU (Byrne 2017).
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While, like Croatia, Serbia has been motivated to make changes to LGBT, Serbia
lags behind member states Croatia and Slovenia with regards to the present state of
LGBT rights. Where Croatia began their accession process in 2004 Serbia’s process
began in 2012. This is reflected in the present context of LGBT rights in Serbia. Serbia
has far fewer legal protections for the LGBT community than Croatia and Slovenia. For
example, both Slovenia and Croatia legally recognize hate crimes based on sexual
orientation, having passed the appropriate legislation in 2008 and 2006 respectively.
Serbia does not have such recognitions of crimes motivated by homophobia. While other
issues are of a greater priority for progress towards Serbia’s potential EU membership,
normalizing Serbia-Kosovo relations for example, Serbia will have to expand LGBT
human rights in order to qualify for membership.
In the European Commission’s 2018 report on Serbia protecting the LGBT
community from discrimination was listed among the shortcomings in fundamental rights
which still need to be addressed by Serbia (23). The report also stated that 2017 saw a
small increase in violence targeted at LGBT persons while legal resources including
prosecution continue to be inadequate, with Transgender individuals being particularly
vulnerable and lacking support (28). As evident from the current state of LGBT rights,
Serbia certainly has a lot of progress to make before they can meet EU standards of
fundamental rights. From the progression Serbia has made since 2012, however, I believe
that as long desire to join the EU remains strong LGBT rights will continue to improve in
Serbia.
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4.3 Kosovo
Kosovo’s unique context for EU accession exemplifies the influence of potential
EU membership specifically as well as just how dramatic and swift the changes in
approach to LGBT rights can be. While Kosovo has a close relationship with the EU,
Kosovo is still only a potential candidate for EU membership, further from potential
future membership than Serbia, which has candidate status. Kosovo gained its potential
candidate status after signing onto the Stabilization and Association Agreement, a part of
the EU Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) with the countries of the Western
Balkans. Kosovo has a unique relationship with the European Union particularly through
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) which launched in 2008
following Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The mission of EULEX is to assist in
creating sustainable and independent rule of law in Kosovo and its current mandate goes
through 2020. While Kosovo is farther from EU accession than Serbia, its unique
relationship provides interesting insight.
However close Kosovo is with the EU, there is still a long way to go before it can
reach EU membership. Kosovo has a weak economy, a government barely ten years old,
and lacks universal recognition of its independence even within the EU. There are many
areas which are of a much greater interest in potential negotiations with the EU at the
present, including ongoing disputes with Serbia, than LGBT rights. This, in combination
with the fact that a National Democratic Institute (NDI) 2015 survey rated Kosovo the
most homophobic country in the Balkans, provides context to help us understand
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Kosovo’s trajectory with regards to LGBT human rights (“LGBTI Public Opinion Poll:
Western Balkans” 2015).

Figure 3: Kosovo Timeline

There are two key points to note on the timeline with regards to Kosovo’s
relationship with the EU: the launch of EULEX in December 2008 and the Stabilization
and Association Agreement went into force in Kosovo which went into effect in April
2016 and Kosovo became a potential candidate for EU membership. EULEX is
significant in marking the relationship between Kosovo and the EU. The Stabilization
and Association Agreement, however, marks the movement of Kosovo towards future
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EU membership and the introduction of future expectations in human rights. The
agreement is most significant in examining the connection between Kosovo’s changing
relationship with the EU and LGBT human rights. From the timeline, we can see that
Kosovo made initial legal changes with regards to the equalization of the ages of consent
for homosexual and heterosexual sex acts and the introduction of anti-discrimination
legislation in the years between the Kosovo War and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence from Kosovo, while Kosovo was under the administration of UNMIK.
In relation to the other three cases included in this paper, it is remarkable how
recently and how swiftly Kosovo has changed its approach to LGBT human rights. While
there were earlier changes under UNMIK administration, recent changes have been
dramatic and far more internally direction (albeit with the motivation of relations with the
EU). In just five years Kosovo went from having the 2012 launch party of a magazine
which discussed LGBT sexuality and issues violently attacked to being able to hold Pride
in 2017 without violence. This is a truly unprecedented shift particularly when compared
to Serbia. While Kosovo and Serbia are in a similar place in early 2019 in terms of their
legal accommodation of the LGBT community, Kosovo’s progression has been much
more recent and in a much shorter time frame.
With regards to Kosovo, it is impossible to separate the progress on LGBT rights
at a legislative level from the influence of the international community, particularly the
EU. While, because of the continuous presence of the international community in Kosovo
since 1999, it is impossible to isolate pre-influence and post-influence timeframes with
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regards to LGBT rights the consequences of potential EU membership for Kosovo’s
human rights record are clear. Similar to Serbia, the benefits of EU membership would be
extremely beneficial. Not only would membership give Kosovo the typical economic and
political benefits it would also give them international legitimacy that they currently lack.
While not yet an official EU membership candidate, the incentives are certainly there for
Kosovo to continue to make progress in LGBT human rights.

4.4 Slovenia
Slovenia’s timing with regards to EU membership and the introduction of LGBT
rights into the accession process is such that it is not the ideal illustration of how the new
focus on fundamental rights shapes candidate states. Still, the progress Slovenia has made
since obtaining membership does give a hint as to the influence of these changes outside
the accession process. Slovenia was the first former Yugoslav state to successfully join
the EU, completing the process just as LGBT rights were becoming important in the EU
accession process. As a result, LGBT rights emerged as an important requirement when
Slovenia was already well into its own accession process. For this reason, Slovenia does
not necessarily serve as a good example of the impact of the prioritization of LGBT
rights in the accession process. I still include Slovenia as a case study in this project
because as the first former Yugoslav state to join the EU and the least homophobic state
in the region Slovenia still possesses relevance in the question of the relationship between
EU membership and LGBT rights in the western Balkans. Additionally, because Slovenia
has been an EU member for much longer than Croatia and has made significant progress
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on LGBT rights since becoming an EU member state, it can serve as a case study for how
the EU can continue to influence LGBT human rights once the incentive of future
membership is gone.
As is evident in the timeline, Slovenia made many of its shifts towards more
progressive LGBT rights policies after it was already an EU member, but along a similar
timeline to Croatia’s changes once the EU’s new LGBT priorities had been enacted. As
an EU member state, Slovenia is obliged to comply with EU standards in all areas,
including fundamental rights. The fact remains, however, that without the incentive of
future EU membership many states, particularly in Eastern Europe, lag behind in
controversial areas unpopular with the general public including LGBT rights. For
example, Poland’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) political party has used opposition to
LGBT rights to boost their popularity among far-right Poles. As ruling party PiS has
opposed progress on LGBT rights within Poland, despite the fact that Poland is an EU
member state (Cienski 2019). Continuing to make progress on LGBT rights once
membership is obtained is not necessarily a given in Eastern European member states.
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Figure 4: Slovenia Timeline

Notably, in 2016 Slovenia became the first and, currently, only former Yugoslav
state to recognize same-sex marriage. While Slovenia’s same-sex marriage laws come
with restrictions, same-sex couples still cannot jointly adopt and lack in vitro fertilization
rights, it is was a dramatic legislative turn for LGBT rights in Slovenia. What is
particularly remarkable in this case is that in voting to recognize same-sex marriage,
Slovenia’s parliament contradicted the will of the Slovenian people who, in 2015, had
49

voted in a referendum not to permit same-sex marriage. Slovenia’s parliament just one
year later countered that referendum to allow same-sex marriage with only the
introduction of the restrictions which had not been included in the referendum. This
demonstrates that even beyond potential shifts in public opinion around LGBT rights,
top-down LGBT protections continue to be possible following EU membership.
While Slovenia as a single case cannot alone demonstrate a trend of states
evolving on LGBT human rights after becoming EU members, it is an interesting case to
consider how the EU’s leverage can play out with regard to LGBT rights post EU
accession. It is an example of how new EU expectations around fundamental rights and
LGBT rights can change over time without Chapter 23 negotiations.

4.5 EU Accession from a Comparative Perspective
When considering the trajectory of these four cases it is important not to stop at
comparing their trajectories over time but also to consider where they are in the present.
Before examining the places in which there are differences, I first want to examine where
there is an important similarity in the lack of change in transgender human rights across
the former Yugoslav states. Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia do legally recognize
transgender individuals but all three require a diagnosis and medical intervention before
an individual can officially alter their documentation. Croatia also requires the individual,
if married, to be divorced. Serbia has additional requirements of divorce and sterilization
(“Trans Rights Europe Map 2018” 2018). Kosovo does not legally recognize transgender
individuals in any capacity. Blert Morina, a Kosovar transgender man, has filed a
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complaint against Kosovo’s Agency for Civil Registry after they refused to allow him to
change his birth name which is ongoing (Halili 2018). The coming months, therefore,
may bring changes in this area for Kosovo.
Transgender rights are not prioritized by the EU in fundamental rights, despite
their expansion in the 21st century, in the same way lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB)
rights are. There are clear differences, however, between the states with regards to LGB
human rights in the present day. I have argued in this section that by examining the
timeline of the EU’s introduction of new priorities in fundamental rights, the introduction
of each state to the accession process, and the shifts in LGBT rights in each state, while
shifts in transgender rights are limited, illustrates the influence of the accession and
negotiations process on LGBT rights. In this portion of the section I also argue that we
can see the impacts of this in the present-day conditions of the LGBT community in each
state.
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Figure 5: ILGA Table
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100%

33%
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13%
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By comparing the ratings of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and
Intersex Association (ILGA) 2018 country reports in figure 5 we can see where the cases
are different in their conditions as well as some places where they are similar. The most
notable similarity is the civil society space score with all four states receiving a score of
100%. All four the cases are open to the activities of civil society, including LGBT
NGOs and NGOs which advocate LGBT rights as one part of their work. This is
particularly promising considering that, from the literature, we know that pressure from
the EU or the international institutions more broadly can give local NGOs more influence
and power (Ayoub 2016; Swimelar 2017; Mikuš 2011). In these cases where there is
openness to civil society this is particularly relevant. Additionally, all four states received
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low scores with regard to their LGBT asylum policy with Serbia in particular receiving a
score of 0% (“Annual Review of the Human Rights…” 2018, 52, 80, 114, and 118 ).
For the most part, the differences in the cases demonstrate a clear divide between
EU and non-EU cases. With variation to a certain extent there is a clear indication that
Slovenia and Croatia have similar ratings which are notably higher than Serbia and
Kosovo. This is most dramatic in the areas of family and legal gender recognition and
bodily autonomy. From examining the timelines of each state, we know that Slovenia and
Croatia, for the four cases, are the two which recognize same-sex couples in some
capacity with marriage and partnership registration respectively. To return to the
discussion on issues relating to the transgender community, we also know that while the
states do not differ dramatically in terms of their legal treatment of the transgender
community Kosovo does not recognize transgender individuals at all and Serbia has the
strictest requirements for individual recognition. While none of the cases have policies,
which are particularly friendly to the transgender community, there is some difference
there which the ILGA has noted in their reports. From the ILGA reports we can discern
concrete differences across the cases in the present day, corroborating what tracks across
the timelines of the individual cases. As a result of the changes across time in the four
cases there are now observable differences between the cases in the 2018 ILGA ratings.
By comparing the 2018 ILGA ratings for the cases we can see how the variation
over time impacts the variation in LGBT human rights in the present. The fact that
Slovenia and Croatia were motivated to promote LGBT human rights earlier than Serbia
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and Kosovo means that there is variation in the quality of LGBT human rights today. As
Serbia and Kosovo, presumably, progress towards EU membership I expect that there
should be some movement towards the closure of the gaps between the cases.

Section 5: Conclusion
Examining these four cases it is clear that Europeanization shifts, or at least picks
up, the progression of LGBT human rights in these states. Still, the case of Slovenia gives
interesting perspective in comparison to the other three cases. While the exact incentive is
not clear, Slovenia demonstrates that progression on LGBT human rights is possible
following EU accession. Based on pre-existing literature I would hypothesize that
Slovenia, or any other EU member state, could be motivated to improve LGBT human
rights through processes of norm diffusion altering the domestic norms around LGBT
human rights to become more in line with “European” norms. Unfortunately,
investigating changes in LGBT human rights in EU member states is not within the scope
of my research here, but I hope this is an area other scholars will investigate in the future.
Ultimately, this project demonstrates the influence of the EU accession process on
state actions to improve LGBT rights. From the four cases examined in this project it is
clear the actions of the state can be shifted, and civil society can be empowered, likely as
a result of the changes in the state. What is less clear, however, is if EU accession can
influence the opinions of the public in these states, either directly or indirectly. Without
being able to compare consistent polling of the public in all four cases over time it is next
to impossible to make a reliable determination in this area. Proxy measures, for example
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hate crime statistics, are unreliable due to underreporting particularly in states with higher
rates of homophobia. Having higher rates of hate crimes reporting, for example, could
indicate a state actually has less violent homophobic crime and high rates of reporting
such crimes than a state with lower rates rather than more crime as it may seem from
surface level analysis of the numbers alone. However impactful the measurable changes
made due to EU accession may be, they are limited without shifts in the public
conceptions of the LGBT community. Being unable to measure changes in the popular
view of the LGBT community in the cases is certainly a limitation of this project.
This project demonstrates the ties between the process of EU accession and
dramatic shifts in LGBT human rights across the former Yugoslav states in the EU’s
Eastern Enlargement. With this evidence tied up with the theoretical framework offering
explanations as to the exact motivations and processes which motivate these changes in
the context of the Eastern Enlargement, International bodies, including the European
Union, should consider more proactively the impacts of their influence in candidate
states. The implementation of fundamental rights into the EU accession criteria has had
demonstrable impact in the Eastern Enlargement states. This is not an endorsement of a
paternalistic approach to homophobia in candidate states. The literature indicates that part
of the strength of the inclusion of LGBT human rights in the EU accession process is that
it empowers LGBT NGOs and allies in civil society in candidate states. It is my opinion
that the EU and other international bodies should lean into this facet of the accession
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process to truly collaborate with local civil society and give further power to these
organizations in their state’s progression towards EU accession.
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